Far and Wide
by Douglas Reed

Chapter Three

COMMUNISM PENETRANT

Excerpt:

[Emphases added.]

As to that, the whole future of America is at stake. Dr. Charles A. Beard (in President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941; published 1948) said, ‘At this point in its history, the American Republic has arrived under the theory that the President of the United States possesses limitless authority publicly to misrepresent and secretly to control foreign policy, foreign affairs, and the war power. More than a hundred years ago, James Madison, Father of the Constitution, prophesied that the supreme test of American statesmanship would come about 1930. Although not exactly in the form that Madison foresaw, the test is here now — with no divinity hedging our Republic against Caesar.’

If President Madison and Dr. Beard are right, the result of the test, under Mr. Roosevelt’s presidency (he was elected in 1932) was that power in the Republic passed by penetration largely into foreign hands, and did not leave them when the next president succeeded. The power of American presidents has become so much infected before they use it that even a war against the Communist Empire could be turned to serve the ends of these occult controllers; to judge by the course of the Second War it would be diverted at decisive moments to serve the destructive plan in some way. President Roosevelt’s actions, particularly at Yalta, show that. His own words, and abundant other evidence, prove that he was not alone and by himself, the wielder of power, but that this was exercised by ascendant groups around him.

Whether he knew, all the time, some of the time, or none of the time, whither they were pushing him may never become clear. Towards his end (when Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons said ‘The United States is now at the highest pinnacle of her power and fame’ and Mr. Sherwood, the ghost-writer, urged the President to quote this in a speech), Mr. Roosevelt said, ‘What Winston says may be true at the moment, but I’d hate to say it, because we may be heading before very long for the pinnacle of our weakness’. The ‘strange statement’ perplexed Mr. Sherwood but was a truer picture than Mr. Churchill’s, whether Mr. Roosevelt realized this or was simply fey. Once Mr. Churchill, with similar rhetorical inexactitude, spoke of ‘the hospitable and exhilarating atmosphere of the White House and of the American nation, erect and infuriate against tyrants and aggressors’. The American nation desired to be in that heroic posture, and perhaps thought it was, but under President Roosevelt the reality was other than the appearance.

What real purpose did Mr. Roosevelt promote through the way he used his imperial powers?  He furthered the main principles of a plan for the redistribution of the earth published in 1942 (but clearly prepared much earlier) by a mysterious ‘Group for a New World Order‘, headed by a Mr. Moritz Gomberg. What this group proposed was startling at the time but proved farsighted. The main recommendations were that the Communist Empire should be extended from the Pacific to the Rhine, with China, Korea, Indo-China, Siam and Malaya in its orbit; and that a Hebrew State should be set up on the soil of ‘Palestine, Transjordan and the adjoining territories’. These two projects were largely realized. Canada and numerous ‘strategic islands’ were to pass to the United States (the reader should keep these ‘strategic islands’ in mind). The remaining countries of Western Europe were to disappear in a ‘United States of Europe’ (this scheme is being vigorously pursued at present). The African continent was to become a ‘Union of Republics’. The British Commonwealth was to be left much reduced, the Dutch West Indies joining Australia and New Zealand in it. The scheme looks like a blueprint of the second stage in a grand operation of three stages, and substantial parts of it were achieved; what was not then accomplished is being energetically attempted now.

Certainly President Roosevelt would not publicly have owned such a plan, but his actions all furthered it. The fighting leaders in America (and in England) both thought they saw plainly what they fought for; to sustain each other. On the eve of America’s entry into the war the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, prepared a memorandum which stated, as the major national objectives, ‘defence of the Western Hemisphere and prevention of the disruption of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation implies’. The same dominant aims were declared in another memorandum, jointly prepared by the two Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The fighting leaders in England, and the political ones, in reverse circumstances would clearly put ‘the prevention of the disruption of the United States’ at the head of the list. President Roosevelt, the potentate, in truth thought differently. In 1950 his speeches and papers were published; being edited by a Mr. Samuel Rosenman, one of the three ghost-writers who prepared his speeches, they are of especial authenticity. Mr. Rosenman records that, in answer to a journalist who asked if Mr. Churchill expected the British Empire to remain intact after the war, Mr. Roosevelt said, ‘Yes, he is mid-Victorian on all things like that… Dear old Winston will never learn on that point.’

Then what were Mr. Roosevelt’s private ideas about the British Commonwealth, his ally, and how far did Mr. Churchill understand them?  Mr. Roosevelt’s views seem to have been constant and different from what was publicly supposed; he wanted to redistribute the Commonwealth, in collaboration with the Soviet and to enlarge the Communist Empire. Mr. Churchill seems to have moved about between incomprehension of this and sudden, irritable perceptions of it. Mr. Roosevelt may or may not have understood the ultimate purpose of destroying all nations; his experience was not great. Mr. Churchill, more widely travelled and deeply versed, knew it well. That appears from his own words; ‘No sooner did Lenin arrive in Russia than he began beckoning a finger here and there to obscure persons in sheltered retreats in New York. Glasgow, Berne and other countries, and he gathered together the leading spirits of a formidable sect, the most formidable sect in the world’; and, ‘The citadel will be stormed under the banners of Liberty and Democracy; and once the apparatus of power is in the hands of the Brotherhood all opposition, all contrary opinions, must be extinguished by death. Democracy is but a tool to be used and afterwards broken; liberty but a sentimental folly unworthy of the logician. The absolute rule of a self-chosen priesthood according to dogmas it has learned by rote is to be imposed upon mankind without mitigation progressively for ever.’ No shred of doubt, then, remains in Mr. Churchill’s case that he knows what it is all about.

These two men in the 1940s wielded, or outwardly appeared to wield, imperial power, untrammelled. Mr. Churchill says this was the office he liked best: ‘Power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows what orders should be given, is a blessing.’  To me it seems a curse, in the light of the two wars. However, it set them both free to pursue purposes which the masses inferred to be those of preserving their own countries, first, and sustaining their allies, second.

One of Mr. Churchill’s first actions seemed oddly aberrant; the offer, as France fell, to merge the British and French nations. It would have meant the surrender of national identity in one direction while it was being defended to the last in another; to this day I am grateful to the Frenchmen who rejected it. The idea was not Mr. Churchill’s. He says he was ‘by no means convinced’, and ‘the implications and consequences’ of this ‘immense design’ were not in any way thought out; yet he made the proposal. (A prime mover, he says, was M. Jean Monnet of France, who in 1950 was a prime mover in an analagous project, that to unite British, French and German heavy industry under ‘a supreme authority’.  In this form the plan of the Group for a New World Order goes on and it seems to me all in tune with the aims of the Brotherhood.)

Mr. Churchill was a heroic figure then, yet the British Islanders, had they been told more, might have been disturbed at some of the things he contemplated. As France collapsed he told these islanders, ‘Our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle’. Yet later Mr. Harry Hopkins reported to President Roosevelt. ‘Churchill believed that if the United Kingdom fell, the Empire would be ended, at least temporarily, and the leadership of the remaining units of the British Commonwealth would pass to Washington’.

Had that happened, Canada would presumably have passed to the United States (as the Group for a New World Order foresaw), but why should it have happened?  At that time the British Government urged the French Government with all its might to withdraw with its fleet to the French overseas empire and continue the battle from there. Marshal Petain was even accused of treachery for not doing so (and as I write the nonagenarian is still in a fortress on that account). No reason offers why the King, government and fleet should not have gone to Canada to fight on from there. The British Islander today may be more than ever grateful to Lord Dowding and all those who resisted the pressure to have the last British fighters sent to France. At that time several messages from Mr. Churchill to President Roosevelt spoke of the British fleet ‘crossing the Atlantic’ (not ‘going to Canada’) in the event of a successful invasion of Britain, and at one point the Canadian Prime Minister and British Ambassador in Washington seem both to have taken alarm.

Then the curious matter of the ‘strategic islands’ arose (which the Group for a New World Order also foresaw to pass to America: the ruling idea may be that the World-Government-to-come can best hold the world in thrall from this chain of ocean strongholds). Mr. Churchill suggested to Mr. Roosevelt that the Republic should acquire on 99-year leases naval bases on certain British West Indian islands, in return for the use of fifty old destroyers. He says. ‘There was, of course, no comparison between the intrinsic value of these antiquated and inefficient craft and the immense permanent (my italics) ‘strategic security afforded to the United States by the enjoyment of island bases’.

Much later (November 1942,) Mr. Churchill seems to have been seized by sudden suspicions, for he said, ‘Let me make this clear, in case there should be any mistake about it in any quarter. We mean to hold to our own. 1 have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire … Here we are and here we stand, a veritable rock of salvation in this drifting world.’  However, if that needed saying Mr. Churchill’s earlier actions may have caused the need. Apart from the islands, there was his strange pronouncement of August 1940, ‘The British Empire and the United States will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage … I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll.’  I never found, in America or my own island, any who wanted the two countries ‘mixed up’, unless they were hangers-on of ‘the most formidable sect in the world’ which desires the destruction of all nations.

Mr. Churchill in 1940 may have overestimated his knowledge of what was in President Roosevelt’s mind; this would explain his somewhat aggrieved later protest, for by that time he was enlightened. In June 1942 a Mr. Molotoff visited Washington and President Roosevelt told him there were, all over the world, ‘many islands and colonial possessions which ought, for our own safety, to be taken away from weak nations’ (‘our’ apparently meant the Communist Empire and the United States. These islands were nearly all in possession of the Republic’s fighting allies, particularly the British Commonwealth). The President was specific; the Japanese should be removed from the formerly German islands they administered ‘but we do not want these islands and neither the British nor the French ought to have them either. Perhaps the same procedure should be applied to the islands now held by the British. These islands obviously ought not to belong to any one nation’. Mr. Roosevelt, then, did not want the ‘strategic islands’ for the American Republic, but for the New World Order.

Mr. Roosevelt then turned from islands to mainland ‘colonial possessions’ (which, the reader will recall, the Group for a New World Order allotted to the Communist Empire). The President ‘took as examples’ Indo-China (French), Siam (not a ‘colonial possession’ but an independent kingdom), and the Malay States (British), and proposed changes of authority there. Mr. Molotoff was favourably impressed. Mr. Churchill seems to have become restless when he learned about these proposed dispositions (extended later also to India and Hong Kong). Thereon Mr. Eden, visiting Washington, was moved to mention that President Roosevelt did not suggest any comparable American gestures and to inquire about the President’s constitutional powers for reshaping the world while it was still at war. Mr. Hopkins then consulted an Assistant Secretary of State (Mr. Berle), who reported that the President ‘could do anything he liked ‘without any Congressional action in the first instance’ and ‘the handling of the military forces of the United States could be so managed as to foster any purpose he pursued’.

Such evidence is conclusive but if it were not, the last nail of proof is driven home in a book published in 1950 by Admiral William D. Leahy, personal Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman (I Was There). This shows plainly that Mr. Roosevelt’s grand design was for a large apportionment of the globe between the Communist Empire and the United States, at the expense of the British Commonwealth and French Empire. Support of Communism in China, too, was primarily intended to prevent a British revival there and in the planning of the Pacific campaign everything was done to exclude the British and make China and Japan into a Soviet-American sphere of influence. Admiral Leahy shows that President Truman, when he succeeded, accepted and applied this policy without question. The results of it confront America today. Charity in search of motive might conclude that President Roosevelt’s inexperience and superficial knowledge of world affairs and ill-health blinded him to what he did and that his facial expression at the end reflected an awakening inner consternation about the purposes for which he was used.

In fact he furthered the aims of the ‘formidable sect’ and perilously weakened his country at home. He is the great example of the apparently powerful man, used by others for ulterior aims. In reality he was not even president at fateful moments. Mr. Hopkins was that and he was like a blind man playing with high tension wires. History shows no stranger partnership than this, which built up the Communist Empire to its present peak of menace.

I told how Mr. Roosevelt emerged from political oblivion to become, first, Governor of New York, then President, wielding exceptional Powers against a permanent Emergency. Constitutional restraints irked him from the start; if he did not, like Hitler, proclaim himself ‘the supreme magistrate’, yet in a similar spirit, when his actions were challenged, he attacked his Supreme Court and threatened to pack it with compliant justices. His and Mr. Hopkins’s assaults on the obstructive judges because they were ‘elderly’ read oddly thirteen years later; years in those cases denoted physical health, but neither Mr. Roosevelt nor Mr. Hopkins were to live long enough to be accused of old age. Immediately he became Governor, in 1928, Mr. Roosevelt began a huge programme of welfare expenditure which he inflated from a State to a national one when he became President. In 1928 he first chose Mr. Hopkins, then a little-known charity-appeal organizer, to conduct this spending which later, again, swelled into a world-wide distribution under the name of ‘Lend-Lease’. Mr. Hopkins never enriched himself but sovereignly dispensed more money than any man, or probably any thousand men in the world before, free from all supervision. What manner of man, then, was this Mr. Hopkins?
 

If you would like to read more of this book published in 1951, visit archive.org and download the package “FarandWide”.
 

– 30 –